Superrational types by Tohmé, Fernando & Viglizzo, Ignacio
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
06
88
8v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 5 
Ja
n 2
01
8
Superrational types
Fernando A. Tohme´ 1,2 and Ignacio D. Viglizzo2,3
1Departmento de Economı´a, Universidad Nacional del Sur
(UNS), Bah´ıa Blanca, Argentina
2Instituto de Matema´tica de Bah´ıa Blanca (INMABB),
Universidad Nacional del Sur-CONICET, Bah´ıa Blanca,
Argentina
3Departmento de Matema´tica, Universidad Nacional del Sur
(UNS), Bah´ıa Blanca, Argentina
July 2, 2018
Abstract
We present a formal analysis of Douglas Hofstadter’s concept of
superrationality. We start by defining superrationally justifiable ac-
tions, and study them in symmetric games. We then model the beliefs
of the players, in a way that leads them to different choices than the
usual assumption of rationality by restricting the range of conceivable
choices. These beliefs are captured in the formal notion of type drawn
from epistemic game theory. The theory of coalgebras is used to frame
type spaces and to account for the existence of some of them. We find
conditions that guarantee superrational outcomes.
1 Introduction
Game Theory has, traditionally assumed that agents make decisions accord-
ing to the criterion of full rationality [7]. In contrast to the case of bounded
rationality ([24], [21]), agents choose the best actions to achieve their goals
without limitations to their ability to do so. The research on behavioral fac-
tors in decision-making, initiated by Kahneman and Tversky ([13]) lead to a
dearth of results under weaker rationality assumptions. On the other hand,
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the interest in overcoming “undesirable” results such as inefficient equilibria
in social dilemmas lead to alternative concepts, diverging from the rationality
assumption [12], [19]. One of the most intriguing of these notions is Douglas
Hofstadter’s superrationality [10]:
Any number of ideal rational thinkers faced with the same sit-
uation and undergoing the same throes of reasoning agony will
necessarily come up with the identical answer eventually, so long
as reasoning alone is the ultimate justification for their conclu-
sion.
In a game context, the conditions for “being in the same situation” trans-
lates in the implicit requirements that the players can choose from the same
pool of actions, and furthermore, that these actions have the same conse-
quences for all the players (otherwise, no common election may be conceived).
Then, in such a game, the definition of superrationality leads in the first place
to the choice of a profile of identical strategies. Furthermore, among all these
profiles, since the agents intend to maximize their payoffs, they will choose
the one that yields the highest payoff, the same for all of them. See [11] for
Hofstadter’s extensive discussion on the social and political implications of
superrationality as well as on how it works in different contexts.
To model superrational behavior without resorting to arbitrary constrains
and to justify internal reasoning processes that can lead the agents to take
it, we need to include their beliefs. This puts the problem in the frame of
epistemic game theory. In this field the concept of type of an agent plays
a fundamental role, capturing the structure of beliefs and knowledge that,
jointly with their preferences, lead to the agent’s decision.
The goal of this paper is thus to explore formalizations of superrationality,
taking into account explicitly the types of the players. Since beliefs can be
modeled in different ways, we adopt alternative characterizations of the types
of the agents, and show that they can support superrationality.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the notions of
superrationally justifiable actions and superrational profiles and compares
the latter to Nash equilibria. Superrational profiles are defined based purely
on the payoff matrix of a game. For the players to converge on a superra-
tional profile, a unique superrationally justifiable action must be present in
the game. In symmetric games the existence of superrationally justifiable
actions can be asserted. The example of the Prisoner’s dilemma shows that
sometimes the concept of superrationality can lead to better outcomes for the
players. All of the results can be extended to mixed strategies. In Section
3 we start analyzing epistemic conditions that could lead the players to aim
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for the superrational outcomes, both in pure and mixed strategies, modeling
the types of the players. For this we use measure theory to represent the
beliefs of the players, and draw from the theory of coalgebra to establish the
existence of some of the required type spaces. We compare the epistemic con-
ditions with those posed by Aumann and Brandenburger for reaching Nash
equilibria. In Section 4 we move on to strategic belief models, where the
beliefs of the players are represented by sets of possible states of the world.
Section 5 is dedicated to include the case in which each player draws her type
from a different type space. An equivalence relation still allows to give an
interpretation of superrationality in this context. Finally, we present some
conclusions.
2 Superrational profiles
To get to a definition of superrationality based purely on the payoff matrix
of a game, let us introduce some preliminary definitions:
Definition 2.1. Let G = 〈I, {Ai}i∈I , {pii}i∈I〉 be a game, where
I = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and Ai, i ∈ I is a finite set of actions for
each player. An action profile, a = (a1, . . . , an) is an element of A =
∏
i∈I Ai.
In turn, pii : A→ R is player i’s payoff.
To even consider superrationality in a game, all the players must have
the same set of actions available, so we restrict ourselves to games in which
this is the case. An action of a player is superrationally justifiable if under
the assumption that all the players will coincide in their choices, the payoff
is maximized.
Definition 2.2. In a game G in which for every i, j ∈ I, Ai = Aj , an action
a∗ ∈ Ai is superrationally justifiable, iff for every i ∈ I and every a ∈ Ai,
pii(a
∗, . . . , a∗) ≥ pii(a, . . . , a).
It follows from the definition that the superrationally justifiable actions
are the same for all the players. Assuming that all players choose the same
superrationally justifiable action, we obtain a profile in the ‘diagonal’ of G,
denoted by ΓG ⊆ A, of the profiles of the form (a, . . . , a). A new solution
concept can be thus defined:
Definition 2.3. A profile a∗ ∈ ΓG is superrational, indicated a
∗ ∈ SRG ⊆ A
iff pii(a
∗) ≥ pii(a) for every i ∈ I and every a ∈ ΓG.
Since superrational outcomes are compared to Nash equilibria, let us
recall the definition of this solution concept:
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Definition 2.4. An action profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) in a game G is a Nash
equilibrium, a∗ ∈ NEG, if and only if for every i and every alternative ai ∈ Ai
pii(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
i , . . . a
∗
n) ≥ pii(a
∗
1, . . . , ai, . . . a
∗
n)
Notice that, according to Nash’s theorem [17], a Nash equilibrium always
exist in ∆A1× . . .×∆An, where ∆Ai is the class of probability distributions
over Ai (mixed strategies). The payoffs in the game in which these strategies
are used obtain by finding the expected values of the payoffs defined on A.
That is, if σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈∆A1 × . . . × ∆An, the expected payoff of i is
Epii(σ) =
∑
(a1,...,an)∈A
(pii(a1, . . . , an)
∏n
k=1 σk(ak)).
If a superrational profile a ∈ SRG is reached, each of its actions are
superrationally justified, but the converse is not true.
Example 2.5. Consider the following game:
a b c
a (2, 3) (0, 0) (0, 0)
b (0, 0) (2, 3) (0, 0)
c (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 2)
Both a and b are superrationally justifiable actions and a = (a, a) and
b = (b, b) are both superrational profiles and Nash equilibria. On the other
hand, (c, c) is a Nash equilibrium but not superrational. Neither (a, b) nor
(b, a) belong to SRG, even though their individual actions are superrationally
justifiable. ⊣
Superrationally justifiable actions are not always available, and even if
they are, they would not be chosen by any agent interested in maximizing
her payoffs:
Example 2.6. Consider the Battle of the Sexes ([14]), in which each player
can choose either Box or Ballet. It is apparent that none of the actions is
superrationally justifiable.
Box Ballet
Box (2, 1) (0, 0)
Ballet (0, 0) (1, 2)
Thus SR is empty for this game. ⊣
Example 2.7. In contrast, in the following game, SR = {(b, b)}, but clearly
the profile (b, a) is better for both players:
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a b
a (0, 0) (0, 0)
b (2, 2) (1, 1)
⊣
In non-symmetric games, even if actions for different players have the
same name, the preferences over the consequences they yield may differ wildly
from one player to another. Therefore, it makes sense to further restrict the
class of games under consideration to symmetric games. As a bonus, we get
that for this class of games, superrationally justifiable actions always exist.
Definition 2.8. ([25]) A game G in which for every i, j ∈ I, Ai = Aj is
symmetric if the payoff function pi : A→ Rn is invariant under permutations;
this is, for any permutation τ (that is, a bijection τ : I → I) and every action
profile (a1, . . . , an) we have that for all i ∈ I,
pii(a1, . . . , an) = piτ−1(i)(aτ(1), . . . , aτ(n)). (1)
Notice that the games in Examples 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 are not symmetric.
Lemma 2.9. In a symmetric game, if all players play the same action, they
all get the same payoff.
Proof. If all players play the same action, say a1, then for any i, j ∈ I, let τ
be a permutation such that τ−1(i) = j. Then
pii(a1, . . . , a1) = pij(a1, . . . , a1).
As a consequence of Lemma 2.9, since the set of actions is finite, we get
that:
Proposition 2.10. In any symmetric game there exist superrational profiles.
Proof. Since by Lemma 2.9, in all the profiles in ΓG, all the players get an
identical payoff, an action that maximizes the payoff for one of them gives
also the maximum for all of them.
The following examples of symmetric games show that the notions of
Nash equilibria and superrational profiles are different, and it is not clear
that one is better than the other:
Example 2.11. Consider the symmetric game given by the payoff matrix:
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a b
a (0, 0) (1, 1)
b (1, 1) (0, 0)
Here SR = {(a, a), (b, b)}, while NE = {(a, b), (b, a)} so the Nash equilibria
are all outside the diagonal Γ. ⊣
Example 2.12. In the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, however, we have that
SR = {(C,C)} and NE = {(D,D)} (where C and D are, respectively “Co-
operate” and “Defect”) so both are in the diagonal, but they are different.
C D
C (3, 3) (0, 5)
D (5, 0) (1, 1)
In this case, the superrational outcome is better for both players than
the Nash equilibrium, while in the previous one, the opposite is true. Anal-
ogously, in the closely related and well known Traveler’s Dilemma [2], the
superrational outcome is much better for both players than the Nash equi-
librium. ⊣
We now study the notion of superrational profiles in mixed strategies.
Let Γ∆G ⊆ ∆A1 × . . .×∆An be the set
Γ∆G = {σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) : σi = σj for every i, j ∈ I}
Definition 2.13. Given a game G, a superrational profile of mixed strategies
is a profile σ∗ = (σ∗, . . . , σ∗) ∈ Γ∆G, denoted σ
∗ ∈ SR∆G, if and only if for
every σ ∈ Γ∆G and i ∈ I, Epii(σ
∗) ≥ Epii(σ). The mixed strategy σ
∗ is then
a superrationally justifiable mixed strategy.
Example 2.14. The Chicken Game ([20]) involves another conflicting situ-
ation among two parties. Call the actions S and Y (for “go straight” and
“yield”, respectively) with payoffs:
S Y
S (−10,−10) (1,−1)
Y (−1, 1) (0, 0)
The superrational solution, in pure strategies is SR = {(Y, Y )}, in which
both players think that the other will choose the same action as they do, and
consequently, they are better off yielding.
Let us call p ∈ [0, 1] the probability of choosing S while Y has a probabil-
ity 1 − p. Then Γ∆ = {(p, p) : p ∈ [0, 1]}. The superrational mixed strategy
obtains by maximizing Epii(p, p) for each i = 1, 2. We have that:
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Epi1(p, p) = Epi2(p, p) = −10p
2 + 1(p− p2) + (−1)(p− p2) = −10p2.
This means that the expected payoffs are maximized at p = 0, i.e. SR∆ =
{(0, 0)}, which can be identified with the pure superrational strategy profile
(Y, Y ). ⊣
The previous example might suggest that, as with Nash equilibria, pure
strategy superrational outcomes support also superrationality in mixed strat-
egy. Such parsimonious behavior is not ensured, as shown in Hofstadter’s
Platonia Dilemma [10]:
Example 2.15. Consider a situation in which n individuals are asked either
to send or not a letter to an umpire. Only if a single letter is sent, a prize of
$1,000,000 is awarded to the sender and 0 to the other participants. If either
no letter has been sent or more than one has been received by the umpire,
each player gets nothing.
This situation can be analyzed as a n-player game G in which each Ai =
{S,D} where these actions are send (S) or do not send (D) a letter. The
payoff is 1,000,000 for the sender of the letter if a single player chooses S,
and 0 otherwise.
The Nash equilibria in the game are the a ∈
∏n
i=1Ai such that |{i :
ai = S}| ≥ 1. That is, each equilibrium obtains if and only if one or more
players submit a letter. The mixed strategies Nash equilibria are all those
in ∆({S,D})n such that at least for one i, σi(S) = 1, that is, at least one of
the players chooses S with certainty.
Superrationality in pure strategies obtains in any profile in the diagonal,
in particular when each agent chooses not to send a letter and obtains a 0
payoff, or all of them send the letter, i.e. SRG = {(S, . . . , S), (D, . . . , D)}. A
superrational agent who ponders mixed strategies instead, looks for all the
profiles (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) such that for each i, p
∗
i = δ
∗ where δ∗ ∈ [0, 1] maximizes
Epii(δ, . . . , δ) = 1,000,000 δ(1− δ)
n−1
The first order condition yields
(1− δ)n−1 − (n− 1)δ(1− δ)n−2 = 0
assuming that (1− δ)n−2 6= 0 (i.e. δ 6= 1) we get:
1− δ − (n− 1)δ = 0
That is, δ∗ = 1
n
. The expected payoff is then strictly positive, unlike the
ones corresponding to the pure strategy superrational profiles. Thus, the
latter cannot be seen as superrational mixed strategy solutions. ⊣
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Since pure superrational profiles may not correspond to mixed superra-
tional ones, we have to establish the existence of the latter ones indepen-
dently:
Proposition 2.16. In any symmetric game, there exist at least one super-
rational profile of mixed strategies.
Proof. First of all, for every pair of players i, j ∈ I, and every mixed strategies
profile σ ∈ Γ∆G, say σ = (σ, . . . , σ), Epii(σ) = Epij(σ). To see this, take
any permutation τ such that τ(i) = j. Then the products
∏n
i=1 σ(ai) and∏n
i=1 σ(aτ(i)) are equal, being just rearrangements one of the other. Then,
by the symmetry of the game we have:
Epii(σ) =
∑
(a1,...,an)∈A
(
pii(a1, . . . , an)
n∏
k=1
σ(ak)
)
=
=
∑
(a1,...,an)∈A
(
pij(aτ(1), . . . , aτ(n))
n∏
k=1
σ(aτ(k))
)
= Epij(σ).
To show the existence of a mixed strategies superrational profile, it will
suffice to prove the existence of a maximum for one of the players.
Since each Ai is a finite set, ∆Ai is a compact subset of R
k, where k is
the number of elements in Ai. The set Γ
∆
G is a closed subset of the compact
∆A1 × . . . × ∆An, and therefore compact. Since Epii restricted to Γ
∆
G is
a continuous function from a compact set to R, it reaches its maximum
value, so any of the points where it does is a superrational profile of mixed
strategies.
Example 2.17. In Example 2.11 the mixed superrational profile is (σ∗, σ∗),
where σ∗ is the probability distribution that assigns probability 1
2
to playing
each of the actions. The pure strategy superrational profiles are not mixed
strategy superrational profiles. Notice that (σ∗, σ∗) is also the only non
degenerate mixed Nash equilibrium of the game. ⊣
It could be speculated that resorting to superrationality in mixed strate-
gies may be useful for analyzing non-symmetric games. Of course this is not
possible if Ai 6= Aj for any pair i, j ∈ I, since then a distribution σi ∈ ∆Ai
cannot be compared with a σj ∈ ∆Aj because their domains are different.
The following example shows that even if the strategy sets of the players
are all the same, superrationality cannot be applied if the underlying game
G is not symmetric:
8
Example 2.18. The Battle of the Sexes of Example 2.6 is a non-symmetric
game with two pure Nash equilibria (Box,Box ) and (Ballet, Ballet) as well
as a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (σ∗1 , σ
∗
2) where σ
∗
1(Box ) =
2
3
, and
σ∗2(Box) =
1
3
.
There is no superrational solution in pure or mixed strategies since both
SRG and SR
∆
G are empty. To see the latter case, consider profiles (p, p) ∈
Γ∆G, in which p is the probability of Box. A superrational solution involves
maximizing both Epi1(p, p) and Epi2(p, p). We have that Epi1(p, p) = 2p
2 +
1(1−2p+p2)= 1−2p+3p2, which yields a maximum p∗1 =
1
3
, while Epi2(p, p) =
1p2 + 2(1 − 2p + p2)= 2 − 4p + 3p2 which yields p∗2 =
2
3
. Since p∗1 6= p
∗
2, no
superrationality obtains. ⊣
3 Superrational types
The definition of superrationality is not explicit about one of its fundamental
components, the willingness of players to choose a superrational profile of ac-
tions. That is, superrationality assumes that the players “have reasons” for
choosing a superrational profile. One of those reasons involves the concep-
tion the players have of the decision problem they face. Since only a limited
view of the problem can justify in general choosing superrationally justifiable
actions, we want to include in our models the beliefs that can lead a player
to have such an viewpoint. Thus, the analysis falls straight in the realm
of epistemic game theory [5]. One of the main approaches in this area was
introduced by John C. Harsany, who presented the notion of type to derive a
game with complete information from one with incomplete information [8].
In informal terms this concept amounts to summarize all the information and
beliefs possessed by a player. Once the types of the players are determined,
the game becomes one of complete information in the sense that there is
no external information relevant to the decisions they make. Since beliefs
are customarily represented by probability distributions and conditionals on
them, Harsanyi named the players of such a game ‘Bayesian’. Each player’s
beliefs have to take into account what the other players’ beliefs may be, so
one gets an infinite regression of beliefs about beliefs about beliefs... As a
way out of this hurdle, Harsanyi proposed that “certain attributes” of the
players, or the players themselves are “drawn at random from certain hypo-
thetical populations containing a mixture of individuals of different “types”,
characterized by different attribute vectors”[8].
While in Harsanyi’s formulation the focus is on a few quantifiable at-
tributes, later research, starting with [3] focused on building a space of types
in which all possible beliefs are accounted for. A quite general frame for
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such constructions is the theory of coalgebras1 on measurable spaces [16].
For a game with n players we consider coalgebras in the category Measn
where Meas is the category of measurable spaces and measurable functions
between them. Let ∆ be now the functor that sends a measurable space X
to the space of all probability distributions definable on X . To make ∆X
into a measurable space, we endow it with the σ-algebra of subsets gener-
ated by the family of sets {µ ∈ ∆X : µ(E) ≥ p} for all p ∈ [0, 1] and E
measurable in X . For a measurable function f : X → Y , µ ∈ ∆X and E a
measurable subset of Y , (∆f)(µ)(E) = µ(f−1(E)). Using this notation, if we
denote with ρi the projection of a product measurable space X1 × . . .×Xn
into Xi, then the marginal of a measure µ ∈ ∆(X1 × . . . × Xn) over Xi is
MargXiµ = (∆ρi)µ = µ ◦ ρ
−1
i . Given a point x in a measurable space X , the
Dirac measure δx is the measure that gives 1 when applied to any measurable
set containing x and 0 to the rest.
Let Ti be a measurable space for each i ∈ I and let T−i be the product∏
j 6=i Tj for j, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . n}. If Ki is a set of things about which player i is
uncertain, then we can use the functor F : Measn → Measn defined by
F (T1, . . . , Tn) = (∆(K1 × T−1), . . . ,∆(Kn × T−n))
so that a coalgebra for F is an n-tuple of measurable spaces (T1, . . . , Tn) and
an n-tuple of functions (f1, . . . , fn) such that fi : Ti → ∆(Ki × T−i). The
idea behind this setting is each space Ti is the space of types for player i. For
each type t in Ti, fi(t) is a probability distribution describing the beliefs held
by player i if she is of type t, about their uncertainties in Ki and the types
of the other players, represented by T−i.
(T1,
f1

. . . , Tn)
fn

(∆(K1 × T−1), . . . ,∆(Kn × T−n))
We consider a symmetric game in which the uncertainties of the players
are the actions of the other players, thus we have Ki = A−i. By Proposition
2.10, there exists at least one superrational profile and therefore, at least one
superrationally justifiable action. Notice that now all the uncertainty sets
are isomorphic. In order to have the condition of believing the other players
1The theory of coalgebras uses the language of category theory. A coalgebra for a
functor F in a category C is an object X of the category together with a morphism from
X to F (X). This quite simple definition covers a wide number of systems in which an
observable behavior is a key feature. For a general introduction to this aspect of the theory
of coalgebras, see [23].
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are of the same type we need the pool of available types to be the same for
all players. We appeal to the existence of a universal type space T , that is,
a type space in which all possible types can be found [15], [16], and assume
that Ti = T for all i ∈ I. Universal type spaces have the property that they
are isomorphic to the space into which they map, so in this case, we have
that Ti is isomorphic to ∆(A−i×T−i). Let ρj and ρ
′
j be the projections from
A−i × T−i to Aj and Tj, respectively, so ∆ρj(fi(t)) represents the beliefs of
player i about the possible actions of player j, while ∆ρ′j(fi(t)) represents
the beliefs about player j’s type.
Ti
fi

∆Aj ∆(A−i × T−i)∆ρj
oo
∆ρ′j
// ∆Tj
Definition 3.1. A superrational type is an element t ∈ Ti such that:
• for all j 6= i, ∆ρ′j(fi(t)) = δt
• there exists a superrationally justifiable action a ∈ Ai such that for all
j ∈ I \ {i}, ∆ρj(fi(t)) = δa.
The first condition expresses, through the use of the Dirac measure, that
if player i is of type t, then she is certain that all the other players are also of
type t. Similarly, the second condition expresses the certainty that the other
players will all play the same superrationally justifiable action a.
The superrationally justifiable action a ∈ Ai exists by Proposition 2.10,
so a type of this kind is possible, and therefore it exists in the corresponding
universal type space.
Even if a player’s type is superrational, the player may choose a different
action than the one associated to her type. That means that a player with
a superrational type may play a non-superrationally justifiable action, as
highlighted in the Prisoner’s Dilemma of Example 2.12. To find conditions
on the players that will lead to superrational profiles, we look at the strate-
gies available to the players. In the bayesian setting the following concept
associates an action to each possible type of a player:
Definition 3.2. [9] A bayesian strategy for player i is a function βi from Ti
to Ai.
The conception the player has of the decision problem she faces deter-
mines the choice of the bayesian strategy. When the determination of the
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bayesian strategy is guided just by the goal of maximizing the payoff func-
tions, we say the players are rational. Yet, if we want to model superra-
tionality, we must fashion the way the player conceives of the problem, that
is, that she restricts her available options according to her beliefs.
Definition 3.3. A superrational bayesian strategy for player i is a function
βi : Ti → Ai, such that for each superrational type t in Ti, if ∆ρj(fi(t)) = δa,
then βi(t) = a.
Theorem 3.4. In a game in which a single superrationally justifiable action a
exists, if each player has superrational type and uses a superrational bayesian
strategy, then the superrational profile a = (a, . . . , a) obtains.
Proof. If each player has a superrational type, and is using a superrational
bayesian strategy, then they all must be playing the same action a which is
the only superrationally justifiable one.
Example 3.5. The uniqueness condition is necessary in the previous theo-
rem. If more than one action is superrationally justifiable, the coordination
problem of choosing which one to play arises. In the following symmetric
version of the game of Example 2.5, both players could have superrational
types and superrational bayesian strategies and still play different actions,
and therefore obtaining a suboptimal payoff.
a b c
a (3, 3) (0, 0) (0, 0)
b (0, 0) (3, 3) (0, 0)
c (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 2)
On the other hand, in Example 2.12, if the second player is of superra-
tional type, she would choose action C, disregarding the possibility of getting
a better payoff by choosing D. ⊣
Theorem 3.7 gives sufficient conditions for a superrational outcome in a
game. While seemingly stringent, they can be compared to the epistemic
conditions required to ensure a Nash equilibrium. In [1], Aumann and Bran-
denburger give conditions, further elaborated in [18], that amount to saying
that for a Nash equilibrium to be reached, all the players need to know the
actions of the others and assume that they are rational as well, meaning that
their actions are the best possible responses to their beliefs. This can be
expressed, in the case of pure strategy Nash equilibria, that the conditions
for reaching a profile a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) ∈ NEG are that there exist a profile
of types (t1, . . . , tn) and a profile of bayesian strategies (β1, . . . , βn) such that
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for every i, and for all j 6= i, ∆ρj(fi(ti)) = δa∗
j
and βi(ti) = a
∗
i , where a
∗
i is
the best response to a∗−i.
The situation is pretty much the same if we consider mixed strategies in
symmetric games. Now we have to replace the sets of pure strategies Ai by
their corresponding sets of mixed strategies ∆Ai. Let γj be the projection
from (
∏
k 6=i∆Ak) × T−i to ∆Aj . In this setting, by Proposition 2.16, there
exist at least one superrationally justifiable mixed strategy σ∗. The exis-
tence of the universal type space establishes that there is a type t such that
∆γj(fi(t)) = δσ∗ .
Definition 3.6. A superrational bayesian mixed strategy for player i is a
function αi : Ti → ∆Ai, such that for each superrational type t in Ti, if
∆γj(fi(t)) = δσ, then αi(t) = σ.
Having defined superrational bayesian mixed strategies, we can now claim
a result like Theorem 3.7 for mixed strategies:
Theorem 3.7. In a game in which a single superrationally justifiable mixed
strategy σ exists, if each player i has superrational type ti and uses a
superrational bayesian mixed strategy αi, then the superrational profile
σ = (σ, . . . , σ) obtains.
4 Superrationality in strategic belief models
The previous analysis adapted Harsanyi’s framework, in which players are
uncertain about the final payoffs of their actions to the case in which the
uncertainty is on the actions to be carried out by the other players. In [4],
Brandenburger addresses this strategic uncertainty defining the notion of an
S-based (interactive) possibility structure, extended jointly with Keisler in
[6] to define strategic belief models. We adapt that definition here for the
case of n players and in the general framework of coalgebras.
Let T1, . . . , Tn be the sets of types from which each of the players are
chosen, and consider for each i ∈ I the set of all nonempty subsets of U−i =∏
j 6=i(Aj × Tj). We call this set N(U−i).
We consider the category Setn which has n-tuples of sets as objects and
n-tuples of functions in Set, acting componentwise, as morphisms. In this
category, we use the functor that sends an n-tuple of sets (T1, . . . , Tn) to
the n-tuple (N(U−1), . . . ,N(U−n)). A coalgebra for this functor is an n-tuple
of sets (T1, . . . , Tn) together with an n-tuple of functions (f1, . . . , fn) with
fi : Ti → N(U−i) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
A final coalgebra for this functor does not exist (unless each Ai is a
singleton or empty, in which case it is trivial), and this is the main result
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in [4]. We can still investigate how to characterize superrational types in
this context. The situation changes if one replaces the functor N by Nω that
assigns to each set the set of all its finite nonempty subsets [26]. This would
amount to the reasonable assumption that the agents can only entertain finite
sets of beliefs.
Thus we are considering coalgebras for the functor:
F ′(T1, . . . , Tn) = (Nω(U−1), . . . ,Nω(U−n)).
We call a pair (ai, ti) ∈ Ai × Ti the state of the player i and an n-tuple
((a1, t1), . . . , (an, tn)) a state of the world. A state of the world can be re-
garded as a state of player i together with an element of U−i.
Following the lines of the analysis of superrationality from the previous
section, we may consider symmetric games in which all the players draw their
type from the same set T = Ti. Then for each t ∈ T , fi(t) is a nonempty
finite subset of U−i. We call these BK types (Brandenburger-Keisler types)
to distinguish them from the models of types considered before.
Definition 4.1. A BK superrational type is an element t ∈ T such that fi(t)
is a singleton set {((a, t), . . . , (a, t))} where a is superrationally justifiable.
Furthermore, player i is in a superrational state if her state is the pair (a, t).
Thus a player having a BK superrational type regards as the only possible
state for the other players one in which they all have the same type as her,
while being in a superrational state reflects her conception of the options
available in the decision problem she faces. It follows immediately from the
definitions that:
Theorem 4.2. In a symmetric game if each player is in a superrational state
and there is a single superrationally justifiable action a, then a superrational
profile obtains.
We can extend this result to mixed strategies by considering the functor
F ′′(T1, . . . , Tn) = (Nω(
∏
j 6=1
(∆Aj × Tj)), . . . ,Nω(
∏
j 6=n
(∆Aj × Tj))).
Here the beliefs of each type ti ∈ Ti are represented by a finite set of partial
states of the world in which the strategies contemplated are, instead of actions
as in F ′, mixed strategies.
Now to each BK superrational type t corresponds a singleton
{((σ, t), . . . , (σ, t))}, where σ is a superrationally justifiable mixed strategy.
A result similar to Theorem 4.2 can also be proved. Notice that this re-
sult can be applied to justify the mixed strategy superrational outcome in
Example 2.15.
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5 Players with dissimilar type spaces
An interesting problem we have only skirted so far is that to define Hofs-
tadter’s superrationality we need means to establish if the type of two players
is in some way the “same”. In a certain sense we abused of the symmetry of
the game by imposing it on the type spaces of the players. We want now to
be able to talk about superrationality even if the type spaces of the players
are different. One way of doing this is to use a binary relation R which should
hold when two types in different type spaces have the same beliefs and they
choose the same action. We work now with BK type spaces where the idea
may be more clearly seen, so we have functions fi : Ti → Nω(U−i).
Definition 5.1. An identification relation between type spaces T1, . . . , Tn is
an equivalence relation R on the set
⋃
i∈I Ti such that for all i, j ∈ I if tiRtj ,
then there exists a permutation τ : I → I such that τ(i) = j and for all
u¯ = ((a1, u1), . . . , (ai−1, ui−1), (ai+1, ui+1), . . . , (an, un)) ∈ fi(ti), there exists
v¯ = ((b1, v1), . . . , (bj−1, vj−1), (bj+1, vj+1), . . . , (bn, vn)) ∈ fj(tj) such that for
all k ∈ I \ {i}, ak = bτ(k) and ukRvτ(k).
This is to say that two types ti and tj are related by R when each of the
elements in the set fi(ti) ⊆ U−i can be matched through a permutation with
one element of fj(tj) ⊆ U−j. This matching between elements in U−i and
U−j is such that for each k 6= i, the action that a player of type ti believes
that player k will take is the same as the one that a player of type tj thinks
player τ(k) will choose, while the corresponding types are themselves related
by R.
In this new context we need to revise the definition of superrational state
of an agent i:
Definition 5.2. The state of an agent i is a superrational state, denoted
(a, ti) ∈ SR
i iff ti is a BK superrational type such that fi(ti) is a singleton
{((a, t1), . . . , (a, ti−1), (a, ti+1), . . . , (a, tn))}, where a is superrationally justi-
fiable and there exists an identification relation R such that tjRti for all
j 6= i.
This means that i believes that all other players will choose the same
superrationally justifiable action a and that their types are related to her
own, while she herself will play action a. Then even with different type
spaces for different players, we have a result like the one in Theorem 4.2:
Theorem 5.3. In a symmetric game if each player i’s state is in SRi, and
there is a single superrationaly justifiable action, a superrational profile ob-
tains.
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Example 5.4. Consider again the Prisoner’s Dilemma from example 2.12,
which is symmetric. Assume that the possible types of players 1 and 2 are
given by T1 = {r, s, t} and T2 = {u, w}. On the other hand, suppose that:
f1(r) = {(C, u)} f1(s) = {(D,w)} f1(t) = {(D, u)}
and
f2(u) = {(C, r)} f2(w) = {(D, s)}
It is easy to check that the equivalence relation R generated by
{(r, u), (s, w)} is an identification relation. Then (C, r) and (D, s) are in
SR
1, and (C, u) and (D,w) are states in SR2. But only in the states (C, r)
and (C, u) the action taken is superrationally justifiable. Then according to
Theorem 5.3, the superrational profile (C,C) obtains.
⊣
6 Conclusions
In this paper we assessed the reach and the limits of Hofstadter’s concept of
superrationality. While the notion is quite intuitive, its formalization requires
to distinguish between superrationally justifiable actions and profiles, the
latter constituted by the former. But this distinction poses the questions
of when do superrational profiles exist and what ensures that such a profile
will consist of the same superrationally justifiable actions chosen by all the
players.
We have shown that the existence of superrational profiles for symmetric
games, both for profiles of pure or mixed strategies. This makes superra-
tionality a notion with a limited range of applicability, unlike Nash equilib-
rium. On the other hand, both solution concepts suffer of undeterminacy in
the case that more than one superrationally justifiable action or more than
equilibrium exist, respectively.
Another question that haunted the concept of superrationality is why
players would reach it in the presence of incentives to deviate, making this
solution much less relevant than Nash equilibrium. The answer we found is
twofold. First we discussed the types of the players, reflecting their beliefs
about the other players, and then their conception of the decision problem.
Both aspects are necessary to explain why a player may choose superrational
actions. Unlike rationality, the notion of superrationality not only amounts
to maximize a payoff, but adds the constraint of assuming that all the players
will identify with each other and therefore play the same action.
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There is certain evidence that in an experimental context, players behave
more superrationally than rationally [22]. This indicates that the notion of
superrationality is worthy of consideration.
A feature of this analysis is that it works only for symmetric games. While
this requirement of symmetry can in the end be lifted for type spaces, it is
still binding for action sets. Further work involves to extend the notion of
superrationality to games with more general notions of symmetry as those
explored in [25].
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